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Rights over Borders: Transnational
Constitutionalism and Guantanamo Bay
David D. Cole*
In June 2008, more than six years after the first prisoners were
brought to a makeshift military prison camp at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba—bound, gagged, blindfolded, and labeled ‘‘the worst of the
worst’’—the Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush1 declared that
they have a constitutional right to challenge the legality of their
detention in federal court. The detainees may be excused if they did
not leap for joy at the result. After all, the Court ordered no one
released, did not address the question of whether the detainees were
lawfully detained or treated, and merely decided as a threshold
matter that they had a right to take their cases to a federal district
court—a question the Court seemed to have decided four years
earlier in the first Guantanamo case it considered, Rasul v. Bush.2
Yet the decision was in fact a profound—and in many respects
surprising—defeat for the Bush administration in the legal ‘‘war on
terror.’’ It means that Guantanamo is no longer a ‘‘law-free zone’’—
and that the courts will play a vital role in ensuring that the rule of
law applies to the ongoing struggle with Al Qaeda. As critically
important as the Boumediene decision is for the place of law in the
war on terror, however, its most profound implications may lie in
what it reflects about altered conceptions of sovereignty, territoriality, and rights in the globalized world.
I.
Boumediene is groundbreaking in at least three respects. First, for
the first time in its history, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a law enacted by Congress and signed by the president on
*Professor, Georgetown University Law Center.
1
553 U.S.
, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
2
542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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an issue of military policy in a time of armed conflict. While the
Court has on rare occasions found that presidents exceeded their
powers where they acted contrary to congressional will during wartime, as in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer3 and Little v.
Barreme,4 this decision went much further, upending the joint decision of the political branches acting together on a military matter
during a time of military conflict.
Second, and also for the first time, the Court extended constitutional protections to noncitizens outside U.S. territory during wartime. As recently as 2001, the Court had stated—without reasoning—
that the Constitution was no solace for foreign nationals outside our
borders, articulating a traditional understanding of the Constitution
as guided by territory and citizenship.5 Yet in Boumediene the Court
extended the constitutional right of habeas corpus not only to foreign
nationals outside our borders, but to what some might call the modern-day equivalent of ‘‘enemy aliens’’—foreign nationals said to be
associated with the enemy in wartime.
Third, the Court declared unconstitutional a law restricting federal
court jurisdiction. The Court has traditionally sought to avoid such
confrontations through the application of statutory interpretation,
bending over backward to interpret statutes to preserve judicial
review where it might be unconstitutional to deny such review.6
Only on two prior occasions has the Court actually declared a jurisdiction-stripping law unconstitutional, and on both occasions it

3
343 U.S. 579, 609 (1952). In Youngstown, the Supreme Court invalidated President
Truman’s seizure of the steel mills during the Korean War, where Congress had
‘‘rejected an amendment which would have authorized such governmental seizures
in cases of emergency.’’ Id. at 586; see also id. at 597–609 (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
id. at 656–660 (Burton, J., concurring); id. at 662–666 (Clark, J., concurring in the
judgment).
4
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). In Little, the Court held unlawful a seizure pursuant
to presidential order of a ship during the ‘‘Quasi War’’ with France. The Court found
that Congress had authorized the seizure only of ships going to France, and therefore
the president could not unilaterally order the seizure of a ship coming from France.
5
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (‘‘It is well established that certain
constitutional protections available to persons inside the United States are unavailable
to aliens outside of our geographic borders.’’).
6
See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 304 (2001).
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found reasons for doing so that were independent of the pure question of jurisdiction.7 The courts have traditionally avoided enforcing
constitutional limits on Congress’s control over jurisdiction because
congressional control is seen as important in conferring democratic
legitimacy on an unelected institution. Yet in Boumediene, despite
the availability of statutory constructions that could have saved
the statute, the Court declared Congress’s repeal of habeas corpus
unconstitutional.
The result in Boumediene was also surprising because the government had precedent on its side. In 1950, the Supreme Court had
expressly ruled that the writ of habeas corpus was unavailable to
enemy fighters captured and detained abroad during wartime.8 Both
the district court and the court of appeals had found that decision,
Johnson v. Eisentrager, to be controlling, and no subsequent case law
had directly undermined its reasoning.
Critics will point to these features as evidence that the Court’s
decision was illegitimately ‘‘activist.’’ To many observers, there are
good reasons for judicial reticence in military matters, especially
where the political branches act in concert;9 good reasons not to
extend constitutional protections to foreign nationals;10 and good
reasons for the Court to avoid a direct confrontation with Congress
over the scope of its jurisdiction. Justice Antonin Scalia charged in
dissent that ‘‘[w]hat drives today’s decision is neither the meaning

7

In US v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871), the Court struck down a statute stripping
federal court jurisdiction over claims by former rebel soldiers during the Civil War
who had obtained presidential pardons, but the decision can be seen as resting on
the impermissibility of interfering with the president’s pardon power. And in Plaut
v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211 (1995), the Court invalidated a statute that sought
to reopen prior final judgments under the Securities and Exchange Act, on the narrow
ground that it violates the separation of powers for Congress to reopen a final
judgment of the courts.
8

Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime,
5 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 1 (2004) (available at http://www.bepress.com/til/
default/vol5/iss1/art1/); Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Terror in the Balance:
Security, Liberty and the Courts (2007); John Yoo, War By Other Means: An Insider’s
Account of the War on Terror (2007).
9

10

J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution,
95 Geo. L. J. 463 (2007).
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of the Suspension Clause, nor the principles of our precedents, but
rather an inflated notion of judicial supremacy.’’11
At the same time, the decision was not entirely unprecedented.
It vindicated the right to a ‘‘writ of habeas corpus,’’ an ancient form
of judicial remedy that finds its origins in the Magna Carta, and
that the Framers deemed so fundamental that they included it in
the main body of the Constitution at a time when they considered
a ‘‘Bill of Rights’’ unnecessary.12 Habeas corpus gives prisoners the
right to challenge the legality of their detentions in court, and is
both an essential part of the separation of powers and the ‘‘stable
bulwark of our liberties.’’13 It is fundamental to the protection of all
other rights, because no right can be safely exercised if the government is free to imprison people without judicial recourse.
In addition to enforcing a fundamental and long-standing right,
the Court applied established doctrine—albeit in a new setting. In
assessing whether the constitutional right of habeas corpus extended
to Guantanamo, the Court applied a contextual and pragmatic
inquiry that it had developed and applied in assessing whether
constitutional rights extend to ‘‘unincorporated territories,’’ jurisdictions over which the United States exercises control but does not
intend to incorporate as states. That test asks whether the application
of a given constitutional right would be ‘‘anomalous or impracticable’’ in light of the particular circumstances of the jurisdiction, and
applies those rights that would not create serious anomalies or
impracticalities.
The real significance of the Court’s decision in Boumediene, however, lies not in whether it correctly applied or modified past precedent to a novel context, but in what it portends for modern-day
conceptions of sovereignty, territoriality, and rights. For all its assertions that ‘‘everything changed’’ after the terrorist attacks of September 11, the Bush administration relied on old-fashioned conceptions
11

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2302 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts similarly declared that ‘‘[a]ll that today’s opinion has done is shift responsibility for those
sensitive foreign policy and national security decisions from the elected branches to
the Federal Judiciary.’’ Id. at 2280 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
12
The Bill of Rights was drafted subsequently as the first 10 amendments to the
Constitution, at the insistence of the ratifying conventions.
13

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2245 (quoting 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries
*137).
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of sovereignty and rights in arguing that habeas corpus jurisdiction
did not extend to Guantanamo, and that federal courts should have
no constitutionally recognized role there. The Court’s decision, by
contrast, reflects new understandings of these traditional conceptions, understandings that pierce the veil of sovereignty, reject formalist fictions of territoriality where the state exercises authority
beyond its borders, and insist on the need for judicial review to
safeguard the human rights of citizens and noncitizens alike.
While Boumediene may appear unprecedented from a domestic
standpoint, it fits quite comfortably within an important transnational
trend of recent years, in which courts of last resort have played an
increasingly aggressive role in reviewing (and invalidating) security
measures that trench on individual rights. The Law Lords in Britain,
the Supreme Courts of Canada and Israel, the European Court of
Human Rights, and the Constitutional Court of Germany have all
issued major decisions restricting political prerogative on issues of
terrorism and national security in the name of individual rights.14
14
In Great Britain, the Law Lords, the equivalent of our Supreme Court, have since
9/11 issued three decisions rejecting counterterrorism measures in whole or in part.
They declared invalid a law authorizing indefinite preventive detention of foreign
terror suspects, A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2 A.C.
68 (U.K.H.L. 2005); barred any consideration of evidence obtained by torture, even
when British authorities played no part in the torture, A and others v Secretary of
State for the Home Department (No 2), 2 A.C. 221 (U.K.H.L. 2005); and barred the
use of secret evidence in procedures employed to justify imposing curfews on terror
suspects, Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB, [2008] A.C. 48
(U.K.H.L. 2008).
In 2007, Canada’s Supreme Court ruled that the use of secret evidence to detain
foreign nationals suspected of terrorist activities was unconstitutional. Charkaoui v.
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2000 S.C.R. LEXIS 9 (Can. 2000). And in
2008, the Court unanimously ordered the Canadian government to disclose to Omar
Khadr, a Canadian held at Guantanamo, evidence that Canadian authorities had
obtained from him when they interviewed him there. Minister of Justice v. Khadr,
2008 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 32 (Can. 2008).
Israel’s Supreme Court has barred the use of coercive interrogation tactics against
Palestinian terror suspects, HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel
v. State of Israel [1999] IsrSC
, forbade detention of Palestinians as ‘‘bargaining
chips’’ to seek the release of Israeli hostages, CrimFH 7048/97 A v. Minister of Defence
[2000] IsrSC 44(1) 721, and restricted when the military may seek to kill suspected
terrorist leaders. HCJ 769/02 The Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. The
Government of Israel [2005] IsrSC
.
The European Court of Human Rights has barred countries from deporting terror
suspects to countries where they face a risk of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
Saadi v Italy, [2008] Eur. Ct. H.R. 37201/06.
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These increasingly confident judicial assertions of authority in
turn reflect global transformations in international law since the end
of World War II, including most significantly international human
rights law. The latter half of the 20th century and the beginning of
the 21st have witnessed an extraordinary explosion of human rights,
beginning with the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
and finding reflection in international treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Geneva Conventions, and the Convention Against Torture. This trend is reinforced
by regional agreements for the establishment and enforcement of
human rights, especially the European Convention on Human
Rights; the growth in influence and power of nongovernmental
human rights groups; the increasing resort by domestic courts to
international and comparative standards in the interpretation of
their own laws;15 and the recognition of ‘‘universal jurisdiction’’
as a way of holding abusers of certain fundamental human rights
accountable wherever they are found.16
These developments have transformed international law from a
subject that concerned only state-to-state relations to one that focuses
just as significantly on the relations of states to their own citizens,
and to others subject to their authority. In particular, international
human rights law has made substantial inroads on traditional
notions of sovereignty and territoriality that once left states both
unaccountable to outsiders for what they did to their own citizens
inside their borders, and unaccountable to domestic law for what
they did to others outside their borders. The lasting significance of
Boumediene will rest on its recognition of, and critical role in, the
transformation of our understandings of this interplay between sovereignty, territoriality, and human rights.
And Germany’s highest court has twice in recent years ruled that computer ‘‘data
mining’’ measures designed to identify terrorists violate privacy rights. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 4, 2006, 1 BvR 518/02
(F.R.G.); Bundesgerichtshof [BFG] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 26, 2006, III ZR 40/
06 (F.R.G.).
15
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 573 (2003).
16
See, e.g. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that U.S.
courts could hold a Paraguayan official liable for torturing a Paraguayan in Paraguay);
Kenneth Roth, The Case for Universal Jurisdiction, 80 Foreign Affairs 5 (Sept./Oct.
2001).
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II.
The central issue in Boumediene was whether the privilege of
habeas corpus protects foreign nationals captured abroad and held
as enemy combatants at Guantanamo. The Bush administration consciously chose to house its detainees at Guantanamo, a military base
in Cuba that we have the right to lease as long as we choose, because
it thought its location beyond our borders would afford it a ‘‘lawfree zone.’’
In 2004, the Court ruled in its first Guantanamo case, Rasul v.
Bush, that the existing federal habeas statute provided review to
persons held at Guantanamo.17 But that decision was superseded
when, in the Military Commissions Act, Congress stripped the courts
of habeas jurisdiction over detainees’ claims.18 As a result, the Court
in Boumediene was confronted with the question of whether Guantanamo detainees have a constitutional right to habeas corpus—that
is, one that cannot be taken away unless Congress suspends the writ
in times of ‘‘rebellion or invasion.’’ The Court in Rasul had simply
employed statutory interpretation, and as such left Congress free to
respond, as it did, by changing the law. In Boumediene, however,
the Court thwarted the will of the president and Congress acting
together, and did so on constitutional grounds—which are far less
susceptible to a political override.
In arguing that habeas did not extend to Guantanamo, the administration invoked traditional territorial conceptions of national sovereignty and rights. While the Constitution is unquestionably supreme
within U.S. sovereign territory, courts have generally been reluctant
to extend its protections beyond our borders, even to restrict our
own government’s actions. For example, the Court has held that the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search by U.S. agents of a
Mexican national’s home in Mexico,19 and that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not protect foreign nationals with
respect to admission to the United States, even if they have been
17

542 U.S. 466.
The Military Commission Act provided that ‘‘[n]o court, justice, or judge shall
have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed
by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been determined
by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is
awaiting such determination.’’ 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(e)(1) (Supp. 2007).
19
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
18
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detained on Ellis Island for years.20 And in Johnson v. Eisentrager, the
Court noted that the foreign prisoners had committed their offenses
abroad, been captured abroad, tried abroad, and had never been
inside U.S. territory, in declining to extend habeas corpus to them.21
The government also stressed the status of the detainees as foreign
enemies of the state. Even if the constitutional right of habeas corpus
might extend to a U.S. citizen held by the United States abroad, the
government maintained, it should not reach foreigners deemed to
be enemies in a military conflict. The Supreme Court had previously
extended constitutional protections to U.S. citizens abroad,22 but the
government argued that those cases rested on the ties of citizenship
and could not be extended to foreign nationals—much less those
associated with the enemy.
The Boumediene Court ruled that at least some constitutional rights
can reach beyond U.S. borders to foreign nationals. As a formal
matter, it did so by looking back, not forward. It initially examined
the historical evidence regarding the scope of habeas corpus under
English common law at the time of the Founding, and concluded that
the evidence was ambiguous. British courts had exercised habeas
jurisdiction over claims of alleged ‘‘enemy aliens’’ during wartime,
but they had generally been in custody in England at the time.
British courts had also exercised habeas jurisdiction over India and
Ireland, but had declined to do so over Scotland. The Court ultimately concluded that this historical evidence left the issue open:
There were no clear precedents establishing or denying habeas corpus jurisdiction in analogous circumstances (in large part because
there were no precisely analogous circumstances).
The Court then turned to its own jurisprudence concerning the
application of the Constitution to so-called unincorporated territories—areas such as Guam or the Philippines that were (for a time)
under U.S. control, but were not intended to be ‘‘incorporated’’ as
states into the Union. The Court held that the Constitution applies
of its own force in full to ‘‘incorporated’’ territories destined to

20

United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Shaughnessy
v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
21
22

Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778 (1950).
See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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become states, but applies only in part to ‘‘unincorporated’’ territories. The selective application of the Constitution to unincorporated
territories was motivated by the need to be respectful of the territory’s own legal tradition and culture. Accordingly, the Court—in
what have come to be known as the Insular Cases—undertook a
context-specific inquiry that asks ‘‘whether judicial enforcement of
the provision would be ‘impracticable and anomalous.’’’23
The Boumediene Court read Johnson v. Eisentrager within this doctrinal tradition, noting that the Eisentrager decision had cited a variety
of pragmatic factors in concluding that habeas corpus should not
extend to prisoners of war held at Landsberg Prison in Germany,
including ‘‘the difficulties of ordering the Government to produce
the prisoners in a habeas corpus proceeding.’’24 The United States
argued in Boumediene that the key to Eisentrager was that the prisoners were not and had never been within U.S. sovereign territory,
and that because Guantanamo was subject to Cuban, not U.S., sovereignty, a similar result should obtain. The Court rejected this argument on two grounds. First, the Eisentrager Court had cited the
petitioners’ relationship to U.S. sovereign territory only briefly, while
employing other arguments that seemed in keeping with the broader
functional inquiry used in the Insular Cases. Second, and more significantly, the Court noted that because ‘‘sovereignty’’ was determined
by the political branches, making sovereignty the linchpin for rights
protections would make it ‘‘possible for the political branches to
govern without legal constraint’’25—or in other words, to establish
‘‘law-free zones.’’ Accordingly, the Court concluded, questions of
extraterritorial application of the Constitution ‘‘turn on objective
factors and practical concerns, not formalism.’’26
The majority then determined that several factors distinguished
Eisentrager and made application of habeas corpus to the Guantanamo detainees neither anomalous nor impracticable. Eisentrager
concerned individuals who did not dispute their status as ‘‘enemy
aliens’’ captured during a declared war; the Guantanamo detainees,
23

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2255 (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 74–75) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in result)).
24

Id. at 2257.
Id. at 2258–59.
26
Id. at 2258.
25
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by contrast, were not citizens of any state with which the United
States is at war, and denied that they had been correctly identified
as ‘‘enemy combatants.’’ The Eisentrager petitioners had been convicted of war crimes after a full-fledged criminal trial; the Guantanamo detainees had received only the summary procedure of a
Combatant Status Review Tribunal, the procedural shortcomings of
which made habeas corpus review more essential. The Eisentrager
petitioners were held in Landsberg Prison in Germany, which was
subject to the control of the Allied Powers, while the United States
exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control over Guantanamo. And
while the United States faced significant security threats in Germany
at the end of World War II, the government cited no security obstacles to extending habeas jurisdiction to Guantanamo, an isolated
location thousands of miles from any battlefield.
As the dissenting justices pointed out, however, this sort of allthings-considered contextual analysis gives rise to few general principles of law. As a result, it leaves government officials guessing as
to which, if any, constitutional constraints will apply to official action
abroad, and gives the Court a relatively free hand in future cases.
Moreover, as Justice Scalia illustrates in his dissent, one could read
both the British and the U.S. precedent to preclude extension of
habeas corpus to foreign nationals held as enemy combatants outside
U.S. borders.
III.
The real significance of the Boumediene decision, however, lies not
in how it reads the past, but in what it says about the present
and the future. Although the decision rested entirely on domestic
constitutional grounds, the Court’s ruling reflects important modern-day developments in conceptions of sovereignty, rights, and
judicial review—each of which has been profoundly transformed
by the human rights revolution of the past half century.
As noted above, the worldview underlying the government’s position in Boumediene was decidedly old-fashioned. It treated sovereignty as absolute, and strictly tied to territory; and viewed rights
as derivative of sovereignty, and therefore also territorially limited.
Within our borders, the United States is sovereign, and the governing
sovereign law, the Constitution, establishes rights that are subject
to judicial protection and enforcement. Guantanamo, however, lies
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outside our borders and is subject to the absolute sovereignty of
another nation, Cuba. The government argued, therefore, that constitutional rights cannot govern there, even if the United States, as a
practical matter, exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control.
This worldview is consistent with traditional conceptions of sovereignty and international law. At the time of the Constitution’s framing, for example, nations were seen as independent sovereigns and
sovereignty was seen as virtually impregnable. It followed, almost
as a corollary, that national sovereignty was territorially limited. If
sovereignty is absolute, it cannot coexist with the sovereignty of
another nation, and so territorial lines are necessary to demarcate
the beginning of one nation’s absolute sovereignty and the end
of another’s.
Traditionally, the realms of domestic and international law were
similarly defined by borders. A state’s domestic laws were presumptively limited to its territory, and only in limited contexts could
domestic law extend extraterritorially—as such an extension would
risk interfering with the absolute sovereignty of another state. And
as a traditional matter international law addressed relations among,
not within, states. The objects of international and domestic law were
thus strictly divided. International law concerned external relations
between nation-states as such, while domestic law concerned the
relation between ‘‘the people’’ and their government. Individual
rights were accordingly a domestic matter, subject to the will of the
sovereign, and not a concern of international law.
The Bush administration’s arguments rested on these notions:
Sovereignty is territorially defined, and individual rights are a matter
of the sovereign’s domestic law. That domestic law generally does
not extend beyond our borders, except (and even this exception is
a post-constitutional development) when the state’s actions affect
its own citizens abroad. As domestic law, the Constitution should not
extend beyond our borders to another sovereign’s territory unless the
extension is based on the (domestic) tie between the state and its
own citizens.
This understanding still largely governed international and
domestic law at the time Eisentrager was decided. Long before September 11, however, these conceptions had begun to change. International human rights, globalization, and modern communications and
transportation have rendered borders and sovereignty considerably
57
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less sacrosanct, while simultaneously providing new bases for the
protection of rights. Sovereigns no longer enjoy absolute supremacy
within their own borders, but are subject to the limits of inalienable
human rights.27 Those rights in turn are predicated not on an individual’s geographic location, nor on his or her relation to the state,
but on human dignity, a quality that exists independently of both
territory and citizenship.
International human rights norms have increasingly been interpreted as applicable beyond a nation’s own borders, wherever the nation
exercises effective control over a place or a person.28 The Inter-American Human Rights Commission, for example, has stated that the
obligations of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights
apply wherever a state exercises effective control over an individual,
regardless of territorial considerations. It reasons that the rights
articulated in the Convention inhere in human dignity, and therefore
it should not matter where the individual is found.29 If a Convention
state exercises control over the individual, it must respect his rights
under the treaty. The European Court of Human Rights has similarly
ruled that the obligations of the European Convention apply wherever a state exercises effective control over a particular jurisdiction,
and in some instances, over a particular individual.30 Applying this
27
See, e.g., Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First
Century 452–83 (2008).
28
Sarah Cleveland, Geography or Control? International Jurisdiction and Constitutional Protection for Aliens Abroad, presented at Georgetown University Law Center
Symposium on Human Rights and Immigrants’ Rights (2007) (manuscript on file
with author).
29
Coard and Others v. the United States (‘US military intervention in Grenada’),
IACHR Report No. 109/9, Case No. 10.951, Sec. V, ¶ 37 (Sept. 29, 1999) (available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/99eng/Merits/UnitedStates10.951.htm).
30
The Court has stated that the obligations of the European Convention on Human
Rights are primarily territorial, but extend where a state, ‘‘through the effective
control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military
occupation or through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the government of
that territory, exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by
that government.’’ Bankovı́c and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States,
Eur. Ct. H.R. appl. No. 52207/99; Adm. Dec., ¶ 71 (Dec. 12 2001). And in a case
involving Turkey’s abduction of a terror suspect from Kenya, the Court held that
Turkey’s obligations were triggered by the suspect’s abduction, even though it took
place in Kenya. Öcalan v. Turkey, ¶ 93, Eur. Ct. H.R. appl. No. 46221/99, Judgment
¶ 93 (Mar. 12, 2003).
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principle, the United Kingdom’s Law Lords held that the European
Convention on Human Rights applied to a British prison maintained
in Basra, Iraq, because the British Army exercised effective control
over the prison.31
Even though the United States has been a leader in pressing for
many of these international developments, it has found the implications for its own conduct difficult to accept. When the Senate has
ratified human rights treaties, for example, it has generally insisted
on reservations that ensure that the treaty’s obligations do no more
than duplicate those already imposed by our own Constitution.32
Moreover, the Bush administration has relied on territorial and citizenship arguments to shield other ‘‘war on terror’’ initiatives from
legal constraint. Thus it maintained that the international treaty
prohibition on cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment did not
protect foreign nationals waterboarded and otherwise abused by
the CIA in secret ‘‘black sites’’ abroad.33 And it has argued that
federal officials’ ‘‘renditions’’ of foreign nationals to other countries
to be interrogated under torture there implicate no constitutional
rights so long as the individual was not admitted to the United
States when the rendition occurred.34
31
R. (on the application of Al-Skeini and others) v. Sec’y of State for Defence, 1
A.C. 153 (U.K.H.L. 2007).
32
Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent,
96 Am. J. Int’l L. 531 (2002); William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party? 21
Brook. J. Int’l L. 277, 295–96 (1995).
33

This interpretation, adopted in secret, was disclosed in response to questions put
to Alberto Gonzales when the Senate was considering whether to confirm him as
attorney general. See, e.g., Transcript of Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination
of Alberto Gonzales to be U.S. Attorney General: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Judiciary, 109th Cong. (Jan. 6, 2005) (available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/articles/A53883-2005Jan6.html). When Congress learned that the administration had adopted this interpretation, it overruled it in what came to be known as
the McCain Amendment, which insisted that the obligation to desist from cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment applied to everyone held in U.S. custody, no
matter what their citizenship and no matter where they are held. The McCain Amendment was included as Title X in Division A of the Department of Defense, Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and
Pandemic Influenza Act, H.R. 2863, 109th Cong. (2006) (available at http://www.
govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill⳱h109-2863).
34
U.S. Brief in Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, No. 06-4216-cv, 27–35 (available at
http://ccrjustice.org/files/US%20Appellee%20Brief%202.22.07.pdf) (2d Cir. en banc
review pending).
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CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The Boumediene decision suggests that the Court is more open
to these transformations in international legal culture than is the
administration. That in turn may be because under the modern
conception of international law, the legitimacy of judicial review
has itself been reinforced in important ways. The international
human rights regime insists that democracy is not the ultimate test
of a legitimate government, but that respect for inalienable human
rights is. And democracies are not particularly likely to protect
human rights when the majority feels threatened by outsiders or by
a minority group. In those settings, as in the ‘‘war on terror,’’ the
political branches, responsive as they are to majoritarian desires, are
likely to sacrifice the rights of those without a powerful voice in
the political process in the name of preserving the security of the
majority.35 This is not a flaw unique to the United States, but is an
inevitable feature of a majoritarian process. Precisely for that reason,
courts have an essential role to play in protecting individual rights
on behalf of those without a voice in the political process.36
The transnational trend referred to above, in which courts have
restrained the national security measures of political branches,
reflects an increasingly broad acceptance of the importance of individual rights, and of the appropriate role of courts in enforcing them.
When the Israeli Supreme Court barred coercive interrogations of
Palestinian terror suspects, the Law Lords deemed incompatible
with human rights obligations a U.K. law authorizing indefinite
detention of foreign terror suspects, or the European Court of Human
Rights ruled that nations may not deport a foreign national suspected
of terrorist ties to a country where he faces a risk of cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment, they were insisting on the propriety—and
indeed the necessity—of meaningful judicial review where states
take action against outsiders in the name of national security. The
Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene does the same. Chief Justice
John Roberts’s complaint that the majority gave ‘‘unelected, politically unaccountable judges’’ an inappropriate role in overseeing ‘‘the
Nation’s foreign policy’’37 misses the point of the last half century.
35

See David Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms
in the War on Terrorism (2005).
36
John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980).
37
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2293 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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Rights over Borders
The protection of fundamental human rights requires not only the
piercing of once-impermeable sovereign borders, but also the robust
intervention of unelected courts.
Conclusion
The United States’ legal defense of Guantanamo in the Boumediene
case turned ultimately on outmoded claims about sovereignty, territoriality, and rights. The Court’s rejection of those arguments in turn
is in keeping with a global shift in modern understandings of these
concepts. Sovereignty is no longer absolute, territorial, and sacred,
but conditional and limited by legal obligations to the individual
that simultaneously pierce the border—insisting that a state respect
the rights of those within its own jurisdiction—and extend beyond
the border, limiting the state’s range of choice wherever it exercises
effective control over an individual or place. At the same time, the
Court’s confident assertion of its own role in enforcing rights is also
in keeping with a transnational understanding that, while democracy is good for many things, it is not the sine qua non of legitimate
government; respect for individual autonomy and human rights is.
Because democracies are not particularly good at protecting the
rights of unpopular minorities, especially those minorities outside
the polity, the courts have an essential role to play. Extending habeas
corpus to Guantanamo detainees as a constitutional matter insists
on the rights of individuals over formal conceptions of sovereignty
and territoriality, and on the role of courts in ensuring that democracies respect human rights. It ushers U.S. law into the 21st century.
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